How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States:
Riding the Roller Coaster (Cross-Cultural Negotiation Books) [Paperback]
By: Teresita C. Schaffer and Howard B. Schaffer
Price Pak Rs
Paperback: 210 pages
Publisher: United States Institute of Peace (April 1, 2011)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 1601270755
ISBN-13: 978-1601270757
Product Dimensions: 9 x 6 x 0.4 inches
How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States analyzes the themes, techniques, and styles that have characterized Pakistani negotiations with American civilian and military officials since Pakistan’s independence.
Pakistan’s view of the world begins with the 1947 partition of India that created it, and the subsequent insecurity. (Pakistan is one-seventh the size of India.) Kashmir, ruled by India despite a Muslim majority, is an ongoing source of potential conflict between the two. India’s support for the breaking away of East Pakistan in 1971 is another ongoing sore point with Pakistanis.
Pakistan – U.S. relations over the past 60 years have been marked by highs and lows, with three marriages and two divorces. The first divorce came in 1965 during the Pakistan – India war when Pakistan used U.S. provided weapons which Washington had warned them against using vs. India. Pakstan’s nuclear program caused the second divorce, leading to the cut-off of assistance in the 1990s. Both instances involved Pakistan’s refusal to accept U.S. conditions, and have led Pakistan to see the U.S. as an unfaithful ally – especially in comparison with China.
Pakistanis have also come to see the U.S. becoming more aligned with India as a means of counterbalancing China. Thus, Pakistan is not looking towards China, oil-rich Arab nations and other Muslim countries for backing.
Pakistan sees the U.S. as a counterweight to India and its neighbors, and the U.S. tries to use Pakistan to gain influence in the region. More recently, the U.S. has attempted to partner with Pakistan based on the premises that our and their goals in Pakistan are the same, and that both nations need the other. Authors Schaffer contend that this is only half true. Both nations would like to see a peaceful Afghanistan, but U.S. concerns over al Qaeda in Afghanistan are of much less concern to Pakistan than preventing India from having significant influence there. (India’s consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar don’t help.) Working against the U.S. is Pakistan’s belief that U.S. presence will soon be gone.
Consistent with Pakistan’s lower priority for ridding the area of al Qaeda are U.S. suspicions that the Pakistani government knew of Osama’s location in Abbottabad; the raid also angered and embarrassed the Pakistan army. The U.S. decision to withhold $800 million of military aid from Pakistan, as well as our drone raids that have killed Pakistani soldiers and civilians have strained relations to the point that Pakistan has now closed U.S. access to Afghanistan through the Khyber Pass.
Pakistan has more than 100 nuclear weapons, is building more rapidly than any other nation, and has a population larger than Russia. Pakistan’s military, the dominant ruling force, sees militant groups as actual or potential assets – thus, it will continue to provide sanctuary for ‘friendly’ militant groups.
Bottom-Line” The U.S. has tried to buy Pakistani cooperation with $20 billion in aid since 9/11. Adding criticism to that aid hasn’t helped. Pakistan knows the U.S. fears Pakistan’s collapse, or halting its aid vs. Afghanistan. Only 17% of Pakistanis had a favorable view of the U.S. in 2010, and 63% disapproved of the 2011 raid that killed bin Laden. Given our moving closer to India, and that being Pakistani’s #1 concern, the situation is not likely to improve in the near term.
BOOK CENTRE 
You must be logged in to post a comment.